Energy homeostasis depends on behavior to predictively regulate metabolic states within 18 narrow bounds. Here we review three theories of homeostatic control and ask how they 19 provide insight into the circuitry underlying energy homeostasis. We offer two 20 contributions. First, we detail how control theory and reinforcement learning are applied 21 to homeostatic control. We show how these schemes rest on implausible assumptions; 22 either via circular definitions, unprincipled drive functions, or by ignoring environmental 23 volatility. We argue active inference can elude these shortcomings while retaining 24 important features of each model. Second, we review the neural basis of energetic 25 control. We focus on a subset of arcuate subpopulations that project directly to, and are 26 thus in a privileged position to opponently modulate, dopaminergic cells as a function of 27 energetic predictions over a spectrum of time horizons. We discuss how this can be 28 interpreted under these theories, and how this can resolve paradoxes that have arisen. 29 variables are regulated within narrow bounds by operational and computational processes 36 collectively known as homeostasis (Cannon 1932). The mechanistic complexity of 37 homeostasis extends beyond simple negative feedback control and embodies a wide 38 spectrum of hierarchically organised physiological control structures, molecule to agent, 39 operating over a multitude of timescales, milliseconds to months (Carpenter 2004) . 40
reproductive phases (this form of predictive regulation is also known as rheostasis and a 48 great many other names, see Woods & Ramsay 2007) . However, since it has been argued 49 that predictive control does not distinguish between allostasis and homeostasis (Woods & 50 Ramsay 2007), we use the term homeostasis in this broadest sense, to encompass 51 predictive control. In other words, homoeostasis here subsumes classical homeostatic 52 reflexes and hierarchically embellished allostatic control. Under this nomenclature, the 53 raison d'être of homeostasis is not stability per se, but rather dynamically adjusting internal 54 states to fall within the ranges that afford organismal survival (Fig 1b; Sterling 2012) . 55
For all motile agents, effective homeostatic control results from the interplay among 56 automated physiological processes (henceforth referred to as physiological homeostasis) 57
The aforementioned feedback control models lack any discernible principles which would 152 allow for such prioritisation to be achieved in any biologically meaningful way. 153
Drive reduction theory. The problem of coordinating and prioritising multiple 154 homeostatic feedback processes was a major inspiration to one of the earliest and most 155 ambitious attempts at modelling behavioural homeostasis; namely, drive reduction theory 156 (Hull 1943 ). Drive reduction theory was the first theory to algorithmically tether negative 157 feedback to homeostasis via motivational drive. Instead of direct feedback via single 158 homeostatic variables, motivational drive was proposed as a superordinate internal variable 159 that is to be minimised over the long-run. 160
Under drive reduction theory, drive compels biological agents toward actions that 161 remediate the basic physiological needs, in order to promote survival: "…when any of the 162 commodities or conditions necessary for individual or species survival are lacking, or when 163 they deviate materially from the optimum, a state of primary need is said to exist." (Hull 164 1943) . Drive can thus be conceptualized as a negatively valenced state that the agent works 165 to attenuate. In so doing, the agent attenuates the associated homeostatic deficits that 166 cause it. Stimulus-response associations are reinforced as a function of the resulting drive 167 reduction -a postulate refined from Thorndike (1927) . The reinforcement that accumulates 168 over time determines the strength of habitually generating a response to a given stimulus 169 (i.e., habit strength). The probability of executing a given action (i.e., the reaction potential) 170 is determined by both habit strength and drive. More complex formulations take into 171 account the inhibitory effect of fatigue, but the logic is the same. Drive-reducing actions are 172 reinforced into habits, a behavioural means by which to minimise homeostatic error. 173
While drive reduction theory provides an integrated account of how deviations from 174 the homeostatic optimum motivates behaviour, the theory falls short of explaining 175 anticipatory behaviour that precedes any change in motivational drive. Animals develop 176 drive states prior to any observable homeostatic deficits such as eating when sated, drinking 177 before blood osmolality dips, and shivering before the onset of thermal challenges (Brown 178 
2014). 207
The HRL framework defines a homeostatic state space, from which a drive function is 208 derived, mapping non-linearly from homeostatic state to drive (Fig. 3, & 4 
middle). The 209
central logic is that with drive reductions defined as reward, agents that learn to maximise 210 reward, will minimise drive, which minimises homeostatic error, meaning that reward 211 maximisation and homeostatic regulation (behavioural homeostasis) are "two sides of the 212 same coin" (Keramati & Gutkin 2014) . HRL accounts for anticipatory features of behavioural 213 homeostatic control, showing that simulated agents could learn to incur short-term 214 homeostatic errors (e.g. deviations from a set point), in order to mitigate long-run (path 215 integrals of) homeostatic errors. While the HRL framework accommodates anticipatory 216 behaviour of homeostatic control, it is worth pointing out some of the residual problems. 217
Strictly speaking, HRL theory specifies no criterion to define the biological maximandum 218 (i.e., the optimal set point), but relies on experimenter-set value functions which have no 219 normative grounding. Keramati and Gutkin (2014) choose their drive function as a sensibleand parsimonious guess based on the behavioural and economic phenomena this would 221 entail. Interestingly they showed that several phenomena from economics and behavioural 222 ecology could be accounted for with a simple convex drive function. To facilitate 223 comparison between theories, HRL is juxtaposed with other models in Figure 4 . 224 Active inference. Recent models invoke the notion of variational inference under a 225 hierarchical Bayesian model to solve homeostatic control problems (Stephan et al. 2016 ; 226 Pezzulo et al. 2015) . Fundamental to those formulations is the notion that the agent deploys 227 interoception, somatic and viscero-motor actions in order to control internal states. This is 228 framed under active inference (Fig. 4, lower) , which is a corollary of the free energy 229 principle (Friston et al. 2006; Friston 2012 ). Heuristically, this principle suggests that all living 230 agents resist disorder (i.e. death) by restricting themselves to a limited number of states 231 consistent with their physiological integrity, an idea that is consistent with homeostatic 232 regulation as framed above, and with drive reduction theory. 233
Under active inference, agents stay alive by predicting the states that keep them alive, 234 and act in order to fulfil those predictions. These predictions are generated in the higher 235 levels of the neural and autonomic hierarchies and passed down to lower levels. The lower 236 levels signal prediction errors back up the hierarchy. Prediction errors here are not about 237 reward per se, but rather discrepancies between expected and realised sensory input. 238
Sensory predictions are cascaded downwards in the hierarchy, and if it does not match 239 input, prediction errors are propagated upwards in order to update the model 240 (interoception) or act on the environment in order to change the sensory input via (motor 241 and autonomic) reflexes (Fig. 4, lower) . Importantly, agents are endowed with prior beliefs 242 that are congruent with high-survival states, such as being sated, hydrated and warm. As 243 such, the notion of reward -common to models of reinforcement learning and optimal 244 control -is absorbed into expectations about occupying states that increase biological 245 fitness. Any action that underwrites the probability of fulfilling those expectations can be 246 said to have value. 247
It is useful here to compare and contrast control theoretic formulations with active 248 inference in the proprioceptive domain, because the same principles may apply in the 249 interoceptive domain too. In the control of striated muscle, active inference formulations of 250 motor control replace motor commands with predictions of proprioceptive sensations. 251
These predictions afford the equilibrium or set points that enslave classical motor reflexes 252 or goal-directed actions. This control architecture calls upon earlier notions such as the 253 equilibrium point hypothesis (Feldman 1986) , in which desired movements are specified in 254 terms of equilibrium or fixed points. Clearly, as above, the question now arises: Where do 255 the predictions or equilibria come from? In active inference, these are generated by a deep 256 (generative) model that provides contextualised predictions that are fit for purpose, in the 257 current context (Friston et al. 2017 ). In other words, hierarchically high level motor goals 258 specify predictions of subgoals and so on -all the way down to the predicted primary 259 sensory afferent input in the spinal cord or brain stem. The crucial aspect of this 260 architecture is that the forward model is not used to nuance feedback control (as in 261 comparator models of optimal control theory, e.g. Fig. 2 & Fig. 4 upper) -it plays a 262 foundational role in prescribing behaviour as a generative model (Fig. 4, lower) . 263
Furthermore, this architecture is effectively open loop because its set points are predefined 264 by descending predictions. However, these predictions are generated from a hierarchical 265 synthesis that contextualises them; rendering the overall system a closed loop architecture. 266
The argument in this paper is that exactly the same mechanisms apply in the context ofhomoeostasis through allostatic responses that rest upon purposeful behaviour in response 268 to the interoceptive and exteroceptive cues. decision-making that engenders allostatic change is governed by relatively higher layers in 276 the control structure, e.g. in the prefrontal, insular, or anterior cingulate cortex (Stephan et 277 al. 2016 ). Thus, the hierarchical structure of models suggested under active inference, has 278 the potential to account for homeostatic regulation to unfold on all spatiotemporal scales 279 relevant for physiological and behavioural homeostasis. It is the hierarchical architecture 280 implicit in active inference that accommodates the spectrum of spatial temporal scales; 281 providing a hierarchal distinction between high level predictions (allostasis) and low level 282 predictions (classical homoeostasis). In this setting, low-level interoceptive prediction errors 283 that cannot be resolved immediately are passed to higher levels to induce deliberative 284 behaviour that, in the long-term, returns physiology to its fixed (set) points. 285
A central concept for active inference accounts of homeostatic control is the notion of 286 information theoretical (Shannon) surprise. Technically, surprise is the negative log 287 probability of a state -which coheres with the intuition that an internal state that is highly 288 probable -carries less surprise than one which is improbable. Importantly the level of 289 surprise scores how valuable states are, since the most probable states (the low surprise of 290 occupying internal states close to set point) are most probable because they afford the 291 highest probability of survival, whereas the least probable states (the high surprise of 292 occupying extreme internal states) are the least probable because the afford the lowest 293 probabilities of survival. The high surprise states are thus the states in the tails of the 294 survival probability surface in Fig. 1b . This closely relates to another concept from 295 information theory; namely, entropy, which is simply average surprise. The overarching aim 296 of the adaptive agent is to keep sampling sensory data that is as unsurprising as possible, 297 because the agent expects to constantly find itself in homeostatic equilibria, minimising its 298 entropy. This prior belief (of being close to a set point) is engendered by a generative 299 (forward) model, yet another key concept in active inference, to which we now turn. 300
A generative model establishes a probabilistic map between hidden causes (internal or 301 external states) to observed consequences (proprioceptive, exteroceptive or interoceptive 302 sensory input) by combining a prior (here, encoding the prior probability of internal states) 303 with a likelihood function (a probabilistic map from hidden internal states to observed 304 sensory inputs, see Fig. 5 ). Principally, there are two means by which prediction error and 305 thus surprise can be minimised. The agent can update its predictions to conform to the 306 sensory input (interoception), or act on the world to change the sensory input generated by 307 external states, to better match its predictions (action). The interested reader should see 308
Bogacz (2015) for an tutorial based introduction to the technical aspects variational 309 inference in context of perception. 310
When considering homeostatic control as active inference, it is important to appreciate 311 the nature of prior beliefs. In a hierarchical setting, these are referred to as empirical priors. 312 This is because they can be informed by empirical data or sensations. This leads to a picture 313 of the interoceptive hierarchy as encoding a cascade of prior expectations and subsequent 314 predictions for the level below. In most formulations, deeper (i.e. higher) expectations 315 usually entail longer time courses or horizons, while priors at lower levels are more 316 concerned with proximal outcomes. On this view, surprising violations (i.e., departures from 317 homeostatic set points) induce ascending prediction errors throughout the hierarchy until 318 some (allostatic) expectations change the organism's circumstances. Under this framework, 319 it is likely that some empirical priors are held with greater precision (e.g. body temperature), 320 and thus prevail with only minor modulation over many different settings, while others will 321 be lower in precision, and thus have greater latitude to be informed by context (e.g. 322 hunger). We will see later, that the precisions -afforded different prediction errors at 323 different levels of the hierarchy -are a key determinant of behaviour and the balance 324 between allostasis and classical homoeostasis. 325
In short, prior interoceptive beliefs should reflect (relatively) invariant survival 326 probabilities, and should only be (allostatically) modulated to reflect a shift in the peak 327 survival probabilities. A good example of this would be having a relatively invariant prior 328 belief about what core thermal states the agent should occupy, but then modulating this 329 under conditions of viral infection, where the survival probability function shifts such that 330 higher thermal states have the highest survival probabilities; hence the phenomena of fever, 331 and its related thermoregulatory behaviours. 332
Prior beliefs about homeostatic set points are likely to be hardwired in effector regions, 333 such as the hypothalamus and brainstem nuclei. Such empirical priors are likely to be 334 genetically specified and shaped via evolution as a function of their ability to minimise 335 surprise, given the agents respective eco-niche (Friston & Ao 2012) . On the other hand, 336
priors that pertain to learning and adaption must be able to change during interaction with 337 a dynamic, hierarchical and often volatile environment. For a more expansive account of 338 learning and homeostasis under active inference see Pezzulo et al. (2015) . 339
Summary. In the above we framed the problem of homeostasis, not as a problem of 340 stability per se, but rather as predictive control over the physiological and behavioural 341 processes that keep vital homeostatic variables within the narrow (but dynamic) range that 342 ensure survival. We rehearsed some early attempts at modelling such control, using various 343 schemes of feedback control. While these may suffice for physiological homeostasis through 344 autonomous control (e.g. the baro-reflex or skeletal muscle control) they are often unstable, 345
and importantly do not afford any insight into the mechanisms of behavioural homeostasis 346 that unfold over longer timescales. Reinforcement learning solves this shortcoming by 347
proposing several algorithms that frame adaptive behaviour as reward maximisation, which 348 can be harnessed to defend a homeostatic set point (Dranias et (Fig. 4 lower) . 364
Furthermore, the conceptual objects of reward and value that motivate behaviour (as 365 defined in reinforcement learning), are absorbed into prior beliefs about the consequences 366 of action (e.g. what actions minimise prediction errors), where desirable outcomes are 367 simply those that engender the least surprising outcomes. So far, we have discussed active 368 inference in general terms; in a way that places the predictions of hierarchal or deep 369 generative models centre stage. To properly understand the implicit computational 370 architecture that underwrites allostatic responses, it is worthwhile unpacking the 371 imperatives for active inference in terms of resolving uncertainty. Formally, uncertainty is 372 expected surprise. Therefore, to select policies that minimise expected surprise in the 373 future, one has to evaluate the associated uncertainty in terms of expected free energy. 374 Expected free energy usefully decomposes into epistemic and pragmatic terms -usually 375 associated with intrinsically motivated, information-seeking, epistemic behaviour on the 376 one hand and extrinsically motivated, reward-seeking, pragmatic behaviour on the other. 377
The epistemic part is important for allostatic responses (and is generally ignored in 378 reinforcement learning formulations). A simple example here is the epistemic value or 379 affordance of checking whether the fridge is contains the necessary ingredients, before 380 starting to prepare a meal, or the foraging mammal scanning its environment to infer the 381 location and habits of its prey. Typically, uncertainty reducing (expected free energy 382 minimising) policies are selected that first resolve uncertainty after which, prior preferences 383 come to dominate. This leads to a structured transition from explorative to exploitativebehaviour. They can also be selected under satiety states, where homeostatic errors are 385 attenuated, and the value of exploitative action is diminished. 386
One subtle aspect of this construction is that we now need to posit generative models 387 that entertain the future consequences of action. Although obvious, this means that there 388 must be neuronal representations of (worldly and bodily) states in the future, under each 389 competing policies. These counterfactual futures may have limited time horizons, but must 390 exist under the theory. The resulting deep generative models are sometimes referred to as 391 having counterfactual depth that necessarily entails a future. The notion of counterfactual 392 encoding (i.e., neuronal representations of future states) is therefore something that should 393 figure, when trying to understand interoception and its role in homoeostasis (Seth 2014) . 394
Crucial for our argument is that policy selection depends upon the degree to which a 395 given policy will resolve uncertainty and the confidence or precision placed in the ensuing 396 beliefs about policies. In other words, to select the best policy, one has to evaluate the 397 precision or confidence in beliefs about alternative ways forward. A body of evidence now 398 points to dopamine as signalling fluctuations in the precision or confidence associated with 399 policy selection (Fiorillo, Tobler et 
Neural bases of energetic control 405
In the following empirical section, we survey recent evidence that suggests that 406 particular circuits of the hypothalamus and brainstem play a role in predictive homeostatic 407 control. We will focus exclusively on energetic control, as the experimental evidence for this 408 homeostatic dimension is extensive and (at least relative to other homeostatic dimensions) 409 easy to manipulate and measure. This subfield also contextualises the common use of 410 hunger as the predominant motivational strategy for animal experiments. 411
Hypothalamus as a homeostatic controller. Situated inferior to the thalamus and 412
superior to the pituitary gland, the hypothalamus is an archipelago of distinct nuclei, 413 charged with coordinating a microcosm of homeostatic functions (Fig. 6a) . The existence of 414 opponent energy-regulating processes was an early and exciting discovery; two 415 hypothalamic regions with opposing effects on food intake were found, a lateral area 416 resulting in hyperphagia when stimulated ('feeding centre'), and a ventromedial area 
times, hinged on the fact that inhibition occurs even before the food is tasted. Yet, we 459 would argue that the predictive nature of the signal, does not rest on it occurring before the 460 taste of the food, since even if it were time-locked to the taste at consumption, it would still 461 be predictive insofar as no change in nutritive wealth is yet manifest. Indeed, any candidate 462 drive or hunger signal that changes reliably to extero-or interoceptive cues is still a 463 predictive signal with respect to the slow dynamics of the gastro-intestinal cascade (the 464 cascade of physiological events that happen after ingestion). Arguably the energy content of 465 a food is not fully appropriated until the post-absorptive phase. In this light, the sensory 466 paradox is just as much a paradox for interoceptive responses time-locked to consumption 467 (like taste or olfaction), as they are to the exteroceptive signals underpinning cue-learning 468 (e.g. sight). Since these responses are not taken to be paradoxical, it could be said that the 469 sensory paradox somewhat dissolves. Thus, on many grounds, homeostatic states should be potent modulators of these DA 557 signals. As the animal plays its task for consumption of water or sugar-containing juice, its 558 homeostatic deficits diminish, or are predicted to diminish, meaning that the value of those 559 commodities should steadily decrease. Indeed, given the quantitative evidence for a relation 560 between RPE and marginal utility (Stauffer et al. 2014) , the fact that this is rarely tested or 561 acknowledged (or for that matter controlled for) is surprising, given that the manipulation 562 that makes the outcomes rewarding is continually being attenuated, until the animal rejects 563 further play, presumably because the marginal utility of consumption has depleted to a 564 point of indifference. For this reason, we recommend greater scrutiny of homeostatic 565 states, and their dynamics under neurobiological studies of reward. In the case of energetic 566 variables, intra-arterial telemetric glucose monitors are now available, and could afford 567 important insights in this regard.
At this point, we introduce a fundamentally different perspective on the role of 569 dopamine. In schemes that commit themselves to some form of reinforcement learning, 570 dopamine is usually cast as a reward prediction error (Fig. 4, middle) ; namely, the difference 571 between expected and encountered reward. This is in contrast to active inference 572 formulations, which accommodates the fact that dopamine is a neuromodulator. In other 573 words, dopamine cannot drive synaptic responses -it can only modulate them. This 574 modulatory role is exactly that required of precision. On this view, phasic dopamine 575 responses signal an increase in the precision or confidence placed in beliefs about ongoing 576 policies. For example, the transfer of dopamine responses from unconditioned to 577 conditioned stimuli reflect the increase in confidence about "what I should do" after 578 observing a conditioned stimulus. In short, the reinforcement learning (reward learning) 579 story associates dopaminergic responses with RPE, while the active inference story treats 580 dopaminergic function as encoding the confidence in policy selection, based upon inferred 581 states of the world. 582
Homeostatic reinforcement interface. Despite the paucity of direct evidence for the 583 interface between homeostatic variables and reward or precision computations, there is 584 convergent (but still tentative) evidence to suggest how the interface could be implemented 585 (Fig. 6a & 6b) . VTA-DA neurons host a number of receptors that would mediate this 586 interface; they are positively modulated by ghrelin, a hormone reporting short-term energy 587 deficits, and melanocyte-stimulating hormones (α,β,γ) released from POMC neurons; 588 whereas they are inhibited by AgRP and its co-transmitter GABA, as well as by hormone 589 insulin, and leptin, as well as by GLP-1 (Ferrario et al. 2016) . Thus, the cells themselves 590 provide ample opportunity for interfacing from homeostatic state information to the 591 precision or reward value signal that is broadcast to the mesolimbic system from the VTA.
Thus, the first question to ask is do they connect directly? Yes. AgRP axons project 593 directly to both the VTA and the substantia nigra (Dietrich et al. 2012) , and POMC neurons 594 have been labelled by retrograde tracers in the VTA (King & Hentges 2011, Fig. 7 ). On the 595 reinforcement learning account AgRP, neurons should positively modulate VTA-DA, since 596 they encode something hunger-like and hunger increases the value of food. Conversely, 597 POMC neurons, encoding the converse of AgRP, should then negatively modulate VTA-DA. 598
In fact, the opposite appears to be observed. As noted above, AgRP neurons exert 599 inhibitory effects over VTA-DA cells, directly via inverse agonism of the MCR3 receptor (the 600 predominant melanocortin receptor expressed on VTA-DA neurons), and indirectly via its 601 co-transmitter GABA, that acts to stimulate inhibitory interneurons that inhibit VTA-DA cells. 602
Symmetrically, POMC neurons release melanocyte-stimulating hormones which also 603 activate MCR3, which activates the VTA-DA neurons. These empirical results fit comfortably 604 with active inference in the following sense: If AgRP neurons encode the hypothesis that "I 605 need to eat", then higher level (allostatic) expectations about eating will suppress their 606 activity. However, the higher-level expectations that "I am about to eat" must be held with 607 confidence or precision that is accompanied by dopaminergic discharges. In short, when 608
AgRP firing is suppressed this will necessarily entail a confidence belief that "I am about to 609 eat" and a disinhibition of dopaminergic outflow to the cortical basal ganglia thalamic 610 systems responsible for policy selection. 611
Why the counterintuitive responding? Taken in the context of the predictive control 612 findings discussed above if AgRP is deactivated, this means that under our interpretation, 613 the precision on the prediction of positive future energy wealth increases, which is encoded 614 via phasic dopamine, via the release of VTA-DA from inhibition. Likewise, if the POMC 615 neurons are simultaneously activated by the same sensory evidence, then this has an 616 excitatory effect on the same VTA-DA cells, which together with the AgRP disinhibition, 617 provides a means by which VTA-DA signalling can be anchored to updates of predictions on 618 future energetic wealth (i.e., the consequences of beliefs about the current long-term policy 619 are assigned high precision or confidence). This is corroborated by ex-vivo recordings in 620 which VTA-DA neurons increase baseline firing to injections of γ-MSH (Pandit et al. 2015) . It 621 should be noted that these findings seem to be at odds with the existing consensus that 622 AgRP neurons acts to increase feeding and reward, and MSH acts to decrease feeding (Yen 623 & Roseberry 2015) . 624
This might however be an artefact of the way these injection experiments are 625 performed. Pandit and colleagues (2015) show that infusion of a non-specific MCR agonist 626 that targets both MC3R and MC4R, then sucrose responding decreases (also shown by 627 
Conclusion

639
In addressing the problems of homeostatic control, we have tried to bridge between 640 several different fields, from evolutionary theory, neo-behaviourism, reinforcement 641 learning, and computational and metabolic neurosciences. In doing so, this paper offers two 642 main contributions. 643
First, we revisited how control theory and reinforcement learning have been applied to 644 motivational behaviour, reward and homeostasis. We marshalled existing as well as novel 645 arguments, for how these schemes rest on biologically implausible assumptions, either via 646 circular definitions of reward, unprincipled groundings of value or drive functions, or by 647 assuming degrees of certainty that are incompatible with the capricious nature of our 648 natural habitats. Against this background, we have reviewed the active inference framework 649
as it applies to these same homeostatic control problems. Putatively, we conclude that this 650 offers promise in circumventing the shortcomings summarised above, and at the same time 651 retains and builds on several important notions from comparator-based and reinforcement 652 learning models. Of these conceptual advances, the most important are that set points are 653 absorbed into prior beliefs about hidden viscero-sensory states, that homeostatic errors are 654 cast as precision-weighted errors on interoceptive predictions, and that optimal choice 655 behaviour is framed as an inferential process given a generative model of the body and its 656 environment. 
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on the homeostatic state space, and the system to be modelled. Here, we illustrate a drive function based on 704 the surprise (negative log probability) derived from the survival probability function illustrated in Fig. 1b 
736
we start with the hidden homeostatic states that are sensed via a viscerosensory mapping. This viscerosensory 737 input is submitted to a drive function, mapping from sensory state to the negative valenced motivational drive.
738
The drive reductions are encoded as experienced rewards (maroon), which are subject to a temporal 
